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In this note, we brieﬂy review the now standard Dixit-Stiglitz-
Krugman trade model of monopolistic competition. Furthermore, we
propose a convincing graphical exposition that emphasizes the ﬁrms’
entry-exit process.
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11 Introduction
Among several competing trade models, the model of monopolistic compe-
tition ` a la Dixit-Stiglitz-Krugman (Krugman 1979, 1980, 1981; Dixit and
Norman 1980; Helpman and Krugman 1985) provides an elegant account of
intra-industry trade and plays a major role in the recent literature.1
In his inﬂuential survey, Matsuyama (1995, p. 701) provides the following
deﬁnition of monopolistic competition:
1. The products are diﬀerentiated. Each ﬁrm, as the sole producer of its
own brand, is aware of its monopoly power and sets the price of its
product.
2. The number of ﬁrms (and products) is so large that each ﬁrm ignores
its strategic interactions with other ﬁrms; its action is negligible in the
aggregate economy.
3. Entry is unrestricted and takes place until the proﬁts of incumbent
ﬁrms are driven down to zero.
This model is also attractive because increasing returns are internal to the
ﬁrms, so the problem of multiple equilibria does not arise (as it did in the
1 See Helpman (1990), Baldwin et al. (2003, ch. 2), Combes, Mayer and Thisse (2008,
chs. 3–4), and Feenstra (2004, ch. 5) for surveys. In a series of articles, Neary (2001,
2004, 2009) provides an excellent overview of the literature.
2models of external economies). Furthermore, as Matsuyama has pointed out,
by assuming ﬁrms are very small, we don’t have to worry about strategic
interactions between ﬁrms that make any general treatment of oligopolies
impossible. Although this type of model relies heavily on speciﬁc functional
forms (e.g., CES utility), it remains appropriate to model global phenomena
using the monopolistic competition model.
In this note, we present the now standard Dixit-Stiglitz-Krugman trade
model of monopolistic competition. Furthermore, we propose a convincing
graphical exposition that emphasizes the ﬁrms’ entry-exit process. The next
section presents the basic model. The nature of the trading equilibrium is
considered in Section 3. The eﬀects of factor mobility are brieﬂy reviewed in
Section 4, followed by concluding remarks in Section 5.
2 The Model
Suppose that there are two countries: Home and Foreign. Home (resp. For-
eign) is endowed with L (L¤) units of labor, which is the only primary factor
of production. The countries have identical tastes and technologies.
Each country produces two consumption goods, Good X and Good Y .
Goods Y is sold in a perfectly competitive market, while Good X is sold in
a monopolistically competitive market. Good Y is produced under constant
3returns using only labor; units are chosen such that one unit of labor produces
one unit of output. Wage rates are normalized to unity.
In each country, agents have the following utility function:
u = X
µY
1¡µ, 0 < µ < 1, (1)








, 0 < ρ < 1, (2)
where consumption of each variety is given by ci, n is the number of product
varieties produced in Home, and σ ≡ 1/(1 − ρ) > 1 is the elasticity of
substitution between every pair of Good X varieties, respectively. A lower
value of σ implies that consumers value product diversity more.
The consumer’s utility maximization problem can be solved in two steps.2
First, for a given allocation of spending across goods, maximize X subject
to total spending on the diﬀerentiated products, EX. Second, determine
spending on Good X and Good Y .
For the ﬁrst step, one can check that the demand function for variety i
2 See, for example, Helpman and Krugman (1985, ch. 6).




























Now we turn to the problem of ﬁnding the optimal spending on Good X,
EX. EX can be obtained by solving the following problem:
max u = X
µY
1¡µ,
s.t. PXX + Y = E,
where E represents national income. Then, one can obtain
EX = µE. (5)







3 Note that this function is log-linear in own price, pi, and total spending on Good X,
EX, both deﬂated by a price index of Good X.
4 Note that PX is deﬁned in terms of negative exponents (σ > 1). See, Neary (2001, p.
537) on this point.
5It is important to note that the demand function perceived by the typical
ﬁrm is not (6) but rather:5
c = φp
¡σ, φ = µE(PX)
σ¡1, (7)
with the intercept φ assumed to be taken as given by the ﬁrm.6 Figure 1(a)
shows the constant-elasticity demand curve described by equation (7).
Note also that we can express maximized utility as a function of income













is the cost-of-living index in Home.7
Now turn to the production of each variety. Each product is supplied by
a monopolistically competitive ﬁrm. Before starting production, α units of
labor are required as a ﬁxed cost of production. Then, β units of labor are
required as a marginal cost of production. Thus, the toal cost function of
5 Hereafter, the subscript i is dropped for simplicity.
6 Neary (2001, p. 538) and Helpman (2006, p. 593).
7 Fujita, Krugman, and Venables (1999, p. 48). Baldwin et al. (2003, p. 15) call it a
“perfect” price index in that real income deﬁned with P is a measure of utility.
6the typical ﬁrm becomes8
TC = α + βx, (9)
where x is the output level. This implies a horizontal marginal cost (MC)
curve at the level β, and an average cost (AC) curve which is a rectangular
hyperbola with respect to the vertical axis and the marginal cost curve. These
curves are also illustrated in Figure 1(a).
Given a Dixit-Stiglitz speciﬁcation with constant elasticity σ, each ﬁrm










(σ − 1). (11)
It is important to note that the (long-run) equilibrium output of each ﬁrm
is constant.
Now let us add one more panel for a better understanding. Figure 1(b)
depicts the relationship between the total number of varieties, n, and the
demand level for each variety, c. In the present setting the total expenditure
8 Note that the wage rate is normalized to unity.
7for Good X is constant:9
npc = µE = µL. (12)










This demand condition (i.e., budget constraint) is depicted as hyperbola CC
in panel (b).
On the other hand, the zero-proﬁt condition implies that each ﬁrm must
sell at least ¯ x in the long run. This is depicted as the horizontal line ZZ. In
equilibirum, then, the following condition must hold for each variety:
c = ¯ x. (14)







where the superscript A represents the autarky (i.e., no international trade)
equilibrium value. Thus the autarky equilibrium value of the cost-of-living
9 Since free entry ensures that proﬁts will be zero in the long run, the national income



























It is important to note that the cost-of-living index is a decreasing function
of the labor endowment: the larger country can support a greater number
of varieties of diﬀerentiated products than the smaller country.10 Note also
that as the share of Good X, µ, becomes larger and/or product diﬀerentiation
matters more (i.e., σ is smaller), the impact of a change in labor endowment
on the price index becomes larger.
In panel (b), the autarky equilibrium is obtain as the intersection of
curve CC and curve ZZ, point A. This graphical exposition provides a
easier understanding for comparative statics analysis. Let us consider, for
example, an increase in the labor endowment, L. In this case, the hyperbola
CC moves upward to C0C0. Then, in the short run, each ﬁrm can sell more
than the zero-proﬁt output ¯ x: each ﬁrm earns positive proﬁts. This situation
is depicted as point A0.
However, responding to positive proﬁts, new ﬁrms enter into the Good X
sector. Since consumers spread their income among every variety, demand
for each variety becomes lower. This change is shown by the arrow in panel
10 Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999, pp. 56–57) call this the price index eﬀect.
9(b). In the long run, each ﬁrm sells ¯ x again: changes in the level of the
labor endowment L lead to adjustments in industry output via changes in
the number of ﬁrms only.11
3 Trading Equilibrium
Suppose that the two countries open their goods markets: the eﬀect will be
the same as if each country had experienced an increase in its labor force.12
The product market equilibrium requires that the demand for each prod-
uct is equal to the zero-proﬁt output level:
c + c
¤ = ¯ x, (17)
where c¤ represents the demand for a Home product in Foreign. Adding (13)






Substituting this and (10) into (17), one can obtain the total number of vari-
eties in the trading equilibrium, which is the sum of the number of varieties










11 Neary (2001, p. 539).
12 See, Krugman (1979) on this point.
10where superscript T indicates a trading equilibrium value. Opening trade
can be interpreted as an expansion of market size.
Now we can show the impact of trade liberalization in Figure 2. Let us
take the case of L = L¤. Panel (b) shows the relationship between N and
c, while panel (a) is its Foreign counterpart. As in the case of autarky, the
demand condition (i.e., budget constraint) is depicted by hyperbolas CC and
C¤C¤. The production equilibrium in each country is depicted by point A
and point A¤, respectively.
Suppose that the opening of trade does not aﬀect the production struc-
ture. On the other hand, since consumers now face twice as many product
varieties (from nA to NT = 2nA), demand for each product becomes halved
(the increase from ¯ x to ¯ x/2). Because each country specializes in a diﬀer-
ent range of diﬀerentiated products, intra-industry trade in Good X occurs.
Home consumers’ consumption point moves from point A to point B. Thus,
the total import volume of Foreign varieties is shown by the shaded rectan-
gle. Although the (wage) income level in terms of the numeraire remains
unchanged, an increase in the number of product varieties implies that the




















Note that an increasing availability of diﬀerentiated products leads to a lower
11cost of obtaining each unit of utility, u, although the price of each product
remains constant.
4 Factor Mobility
Now suppose that there are impediments to trade in goods, but economic
integration makes it possible for some workers to migrate across countries.13
Workers migrate toward the country where the equilibrium real wage is











That is, in the presence of internal scale economies, a larger country oﬀers a
greater number of diﬀerentiated products and thus the real wage rate becomes
higher than in the smaller country.
In this setting, workers migrate from the smaller country to the larger
country. Thus, the size of the larger country will expand, while the size of
the smaller country will shrink. The point is that there will be a cumulative
process in which the wide range of diﬀerentiated products attracts workers,
and immigration will enhance further expansion of the range of diﬀerentiated
products.
13 Krugman (1979, pp. 477–478), Helpman and Krugman (1985, ch. 11), Matsuyama
(1995, pp. 712–713).
12Figure 3 illustrates the allocation of labor between countries. The hor-
izontal axis represents the total labor force in the world economy, L + L¤.
The quantity of labor employed in Home (resp. Foreign) is measured from
the left (resp. right). The left (resp. right) vertical axis shows the real
wage rate (21) in Home (resp. Foreign). Initially, in the autarkic equilibrium
with identical labor endowments (L = L¤), wage rates are equalized between
countries. The relationship in Home between the total labor force and the












Likewise, the relationship in Foreign is depicted with the curve ω¤.
Now let us describe the process of labor movement. If some workers move
from Foreign to Home, it raises the real wage rate in Home, while lowering the
real wage rate in Foreign. This wage gap further stimulates labor movement
from Foreign to Home. Note that this movement hurts those left behind
in Foreign (i.e., the smaller country). While the Home wage rate increases
along the ω curve, the Foreign counterpart decreases along the ω¤ curve.
This provides a striking contrast with the case of trade in goods, in which
all workers gain and those in the small country gain the most.14
Until now, we have concentrated on the case with identical technologies
14 Matsuyama (1995, p. 712).
13between countries. Now let us brieﬂy review what happens if both ﬁxed and
variable costs are higher in one country.15 In this case, it is clearly desirable
that all worker should move to the other country. But if the inferior country
starts with a large enough share of the labor endowment, migration may
move in the wrong direction.16 As in the case of external economies, the
world economy may be trapped into a Pareto inferior situation.17
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have brieﬂy reviewed the now standard Dixit-Stiglitz-
Krugman model of monopolistic competition. In particular, we have pro-
posed a convincing graphical exposition that emphasizes the ﬁrms’ entry-exit
process, which facilitates the understanding of several topics such as deter-
minants of equilibrium and existence of intra-indutry trade. Although this
tractable model of monopolistic competition relies heavily on speciﬁc func-
tional forms, it will remain as one of the key ingredients of trade models for
15 Krugman (1979, p. 478). Matsuyama and Takahashi (1998) present a model of two
regional economies with similar features.
16 Related to this, in the case of trade in goods, Lancaster (1980, pp. 167–168) notes that
a size diﬀerence between countries may become a source of “false comparative advantage.”
That is, autarky relative prices do not serve as reliable predictors of trade patterns.
17 Note also that this model is similar to the models of standard setting in the Industrial
Organization literature. See, for example, Chou and Shy (1990).
14internal scale economies.18 Note that, since this model is quite special, one
should view it as a complement rather than a substitute for the other models
of trade (e.g., trade models for external economies).
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